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1 Introduction	  This	  document	  represents	  a	  cybersecurity	  risk	  assessment	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  File	  Transfer	  service	  and	  associated	  Website	  service.	  It	  provides	  a	  set	  of	  concerns	  related	  to	  cybersecurity	  risk	  and	  a	  set	  of	  recommendations	  to	  mitigate	  those	  concerns	  and	  risk.	  	  This	  document	  also	  provides	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  cybersecurity-­‐specific	  documentation	  provided	  by	  the	  Globus	  Project	  for	  the	  services	  and	  how	  that	  documentation	  improved	  during	  the	  review	  process.	  Please	  cite	  as:	  “Von	  Welch.	  Globus	  Online	  Security	  Review.	  Indiana	  University	  ScholarWORKS.	  February	  3,	  2012.	  http://hdl.handle.net/2022/14147”	  To	  check	  for	  updates	  to	  this	  document,	  please	  see	  http://papers.vonwelch.com/globus-­‐online-­‐security-­‐review	  
2 Scope	  of	  Review	  The	  review	  is	  based	  on	  a	  description,	  provided	  by	  the	  Globus	  Project,	  of	  the	  architecture	  and	  deployment	  of	  the	  services.	  The	  description	  was	  provided	  in	  the	  form	  of	  written	  documentation,	  email	  communications	  and	  a	  roughly	  three-­‐hour	  in-­‐person	  meeting.	  This	  document	  is	  written	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  users	  of	  the	  services	  and	  operators	  of	  data	  storage	  services	  accessed	  by	  the	  services	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  users.	  It	  is	  most	  accurately	  described	  as	  an	  architectural	  security	  review.	  A	  casual	  exploration	  of	  the	  services	  as	  a	  user	  was	  undertaken,	  but	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  activity	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  authoring	  of	  the	  report.	  This	  review	  is	  provided	  as	  best	  effort	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  community.	  It	  is	  provided	  “as-­‐is”	  with	  no	  warranty	  expressed	  or	  implied.	  All	  opinions	  are	  those	  of	  the	  author	  and	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  reflect	  opinions	  of	  any	  other	  entity.	  
2.1 Out	  of	  Scope	  This	  review	  did	  not,	  among	  other	  things:	  
• Ensure	  that	  the	  implementation	  and	  deployment	  of	  the	  services	  matched	  the	  descriptions	  given	  by	  the	  Globus	  Project.	  	  
• Evaluate	  source	  code	  for	  bugs	  (unsafe	  coding	  practices).	  
• Review	  the	  software	  development,	  distribution	  and	  upgrade	  process	  for	  potential	  risks.	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• Undertake	  any	  sort	  of	  penetration	  or	  other	  active	  testing.	  
• Undertake	  any	  review	  or	  assessment	  of	  software	  packages,	  frameworks,	  operating	  systems,	  etc.	  utilized	  by	  the	  services.	  
• Consider	  availability	  (e.g.	  resilience	  to	  denial	  of	  service	  attacks	  or	  non-­‐malicious	  faults).	  
• Perform	  any	  sort	  of	  rigorous	  cryptographic	  analysis	  (e.g.	  of	  the	  web	  cookie	  signing).	  
• Determine	  if	  the	  system	  satisfies	  the	  concerns	  of	  any	  entity	  (e.g.	  XSEDE).	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3 System	  Diagram	  The	  following	  system	  diagram	  was	  created	  by	  the	  author,	  based	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  system.	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Globus	  Online	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  simple	  architectural	  view.	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4 Overview	  of	  the	  Website	  The	  Website	  provides	  two	  user-­‐facing	  interfaces:	  
• Graph:	  a	  web	  server	  for	  managing	  user	  profiles	  and	  identity	  information	  (SSH	  public	  keys,	  X.509	  identifiers,	  OpenIds,	  passwords).	  User	  profiles	  and	  credentials	  are	  stored	  in	  the	  Cassandra	  database.	  
• www.globusonline.org:	  a	  web	  server	  hosting	  all	  other	  web	  applications	  for	  user	  registration,	  sign-­‐on,	  submitting	  file	  transfer	  requests,	  etc.	  Requests	  are	  submitted	  to	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  via	  its	  REST	  interface.	  Other	  interactions	  of	  the	  Website	  are:	  
• Backups	  of	  the	  Cassandra	  DB	  are	  stored	  in	  a	  long-­‐term	  archive	  (location	  unknown).	  	  
• MyProxy	  servers	  are	  contacted	  using	  information	  (server	  name,	  username,	  password)	  provided	  by	  users.	  Returned	  credentials	  are	  stored	  in	  memory	  and	  may	  be	  passed	  subsequently	  to	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service.	  
• File	  Transfer	  Service	  REST	  API.	  Web	  applications	  implement	  user	  data	  movement	  requests	  through	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service’s	  REST	  API.	  	  
• File	  Transfer	  Service	  Database	  syncs	  from	  Cassandra	  DB.	  The	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  Database	  maintains	  a	  local	  copy	  of	  user	  profile	  information	  held	  I	  the	  Cassandra	  DB	  (this	  is	  because	  of	  historical	  reasons).	  	  
5 Overview	  of	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  The	  main	  functionality	  of	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  (FTS)	  is	  provided	  by	  a	  database,	  which	  stores	  information	  about	  user	  requests	  for	  data	  transfers	  and	  the	  status	  of	  those	  transfers,	  and	  a	  set	  of	  “Back-­‐end	  Processing	  Components”	  (hence	  force,	  “processing	  components”)	  which	  act	  on	  state	  in	  the	  database.	  The	  FTS	  provides	  two	  user-­‐facing	  interfaces,	  both	  of	  which	  exist	  to	  allow	  users	  to	  manipulate	  and	  query	  state	  in	  the	  database:	  
• The	  Transfer	  API1:	  A	  REST	  API	  that	  allows	  clients	  to	  request	  service.	  Requests	  to	  the	  REST	  API	  are	  authenticated	  via	  X.509	  credentials	  or	  web	  cookies	  generated	  by	  the	  Website.	  
• The	  CLI	  (Command	  Line	  Interface)2:	  A	  SSH-­‐based	  interface	  to	  a	  restricted	  shell	  providing	  a	  non-­‐graphical	  interface	  for	  requesting	  services	  from	  the	  FTS.	  Connections	  are	  authenticated	  via	  an	  SSH	  key	  pair	  or	  X.509	  credential	  (both	  managed	  through	  the	  Website).	  	  Other	  interactions	  of	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  are:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  https://transfer.api.globusonline.org/v0.10/doc/	  2	  https://www.globusonline.org/usingcli/	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• MyProxy	  Servers:	  Via	  the	  CLI,	  users	  can	  authenticate	  to	  MyProxy	  servers	  to	  obtain	  X.509	  credentials	  for	  subsequent	  use	  to	  authenticate	  to	  GridFTP	  servers.	  The	  credentials	  are	  stored	  in	  the	  database	  for	  use	  by	  the	  processing	  components.	  
• GridFTP	  Servers:	  Using	  user	  credentials,	  the	  processing	  components	  contacts	  GridFTP	  servers	  to	  move	  data	  per	  user	  direction.	  These	  requests	  are	  authenticated	  via	  X.509	  credentials	  previously	  obtained	  via	  with	  www.globusonline.org	  or	  the	  CLI.	  
• Backups	  of	  the	  database	  are	  taken	  hourly.	  Credentials	  are	  not	  filtered	  from	  backups.	  
• Monitoring:	  Nagios	  and	  Ganglia	  monitoring	  services	  operated	  by	  and	  at	  Argonne	  (MCS	  systems	  team)	  monitor	  the	  FTS’	  system	  health.	  
• LBNL	  Monitoring	  Service:	  A	  service	  operated	  by	  LNL	  regularly,	  via	  an	  SSH	  connection,	  pulls	  data	  regarding	  data	  transfers	  (name	  of	  transferred	  files,size,	  speed	  of	  transfer,	  date	  and	  time,	  task	  identifiers,	  hostnames	  and	  ports).	  3	  
• Website	  Cassandra	  Database:	  The	  FTS’	  database	  regularly	  syncs	  user	  profile	  information	  from	  the	  Website	  Cassandra	  database.	  
6 Globus	  Connect	  Users	  can	  download	  and	  run	  Globus	  Connect4	  on	  computers	  that	  are	  not	  traditionally	  GridFTP	  servers	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  files	  to	  and	  from	  those	  computers.	  Globus	  Connect	  can	  be	  run	  in	  single-­‐user	  mode,	  supporting	  access	  to	  files	  accessible	  by	  a	  given	  user	  account,	  or	  support	  multiple	  users,	  known	  as	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi	  User,	  which	  allows	  access	  via	  the	  accounts	  of	  multiple	  users.	  When	  a	  user	  installs	  Globus	  Connect,	  a	  Globus	  Online	  certificate	  authority	  (CA)	  provides	  a	  host	  credential	  for	  the	  deployment.	  The	  Globus	  Online	  CA	  certificate	  is	  installed	  as	  the	  only	  trusted	  CA	  in	  the	  configuration	  for	  the	  deployment.	  A	  client	  distinguished	  name	  representing	  the	  Globus	  Online	  service	  is	  placed	  in	  the	  access	  control	  list	  (grid-­‐mapfile)	  for	  the	  installation.	  When	  activated,	  three	  things	  happen:	  a	  GridFTP	  server	  is	  launched	  on	  the	  local	  user	  computer,	  Globus	  Connect	  establishes	  an	  SSH	  tunnel	  from	  the	  user’s	  computer	  back	  to	  the	  Globus	  Online	  service	  via	  the	  Globus	  Online	  Relay,	  and	  the	  GridFTP	  server	  on	  the	  user’s	  computer	  is	  registered	  with	  Globus	  Online	  as	  an	  available	  endpoint.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  SSH	  connection	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  access	  by	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  to	  the	  Globus	  Connect	  GridFTP	  server	  through	  firewalls	  that	  may	  not	  allow	  inbound	  (from	  the	  client	  perspective)	  GridFTP	  connections	  otherwise.	  With	  a	  single-­‐user	  Globus	  Connect	  installation,	  all	  these	  processes	  run	  as	  the	  user	  on	  their	  computer.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Per	  discussions	  with	  the	  Globus	  Project,	  the	  documentation	  is	  out	  of	  date	  and	  this	  monitoring	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  place.	  4	  https://www.globusonline.org/globus_connect/	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When	  a	  transfer	  to	  or	  from	  the	  Globus	  Connect	  computer	  is	  initiated,	  a	  GridFTP	  connection	  is	  made	  through	  the	  established	  SSH	  tunnel.	  This	  connection	  is	  authenticated	  via	  a	  client	  certificate	  created	  by	  the	  Globus	  Online	  CA	  specifically	  for	  this	  purpose.	  The	  GridFTP	  service	  is	  expected	  to	  authenticate	  with	  the	  credentials	  created	  for	  the	  installation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  installation	  by	  the	  Globus	  Online	  CA.	  The	  GridFTP	  server	  is	  configured	  to	  only	  accept	  incoming	  connections	  from	  the	  SSH	  tunnel.	  	  The	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi-­‐User	  installation	  is	  significantly	  more	  complicated.	  Multi-­‐user	  installations	  run	  as	  root	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  user.	  The	  installation	  includes	  a	  MyProxy-­‐based	  CA,	  which	  creates	  a	  credential	  for	  a	  local	  user	  with	  a	  distinguished	  name	  containing	  their	  local	  username.	  This	  credential	  is	  delegated	  to	  Globus	  Online	  and	  used	  to	  initiate	  connection	  back	  to	  the	  Globus	  Connect	  GridFTP	  server.	  Custom	  authorization	  logic	  extracts	  the	  username	  from	  the	  distinguished	  name	  and	  uses	  that	  to	  setuid()	  to	  the	  appropriate	  user	  account.	  
7 Deployment	  and	  Administration	  Summary	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  services	  discussed	  in	  this	  document	  are	  deployed	  on	  Amazon	  EC2	  and	  S3	  infrastructure.	  Exceptions	  are	  static	  web	  content,	  which	  is	  deployed	  at	  Argonne,	  and	  some	  monitoring	  systems,	  which	  are	  also	  deployed	  at	  Argonne.	  Administration	  of	  the	  services	  is	  done	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  MCS	  Systems	  staff	  at	  Argonne	  and	  Globus	  Project	  staff	  at	  Argonne	  and	  U.	  of	  Chicago.	  
8 Existing	  Globus	  Online	  Cybersecurity	  Documentation	  Six	  documents	  describing	  security	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  Website	  and	  File	  Transfer	  Services	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  Globus	  Project.	  The	  documents	  appear	  to	  be	  PDFs	  generated	  from	  a	  wiki	  page.	  The	  documents	  (and	  their	  MD5	  hashes)	  are:	  
• “Globus	  Online	  Security	  Architecture	  Overview”	  dated	  January	  11,	  2012.	  (aa07531ef64f2ef5a2265bd4fae670d0)	  
• “Website	  Security”.	  Undated	  document.	  (f17213c7c8ae9ba96545b507a68f598c)	  
• “File	  Transfer	  Service	  Security	  Overview”.	  Undated	  document.	  (0ca6b18caea50127cd6182608ed19a5e)	  And	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  this	  document	  entitled	  “Globus	  Online	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  Security	  Overview”.	  Dated	  October	  7,	  2011.	  (8e1f05138201f3fea9944d4cdd008ad0)	  
• “Security	  FAQ”.	  Undated	  document.	  (2b599a217e412f23aefb6041927c6952)	  
• 	  “XSEDE	  Security	  Review”.	  Undated	  Google	  document	  printed	  October	  18,	  2011	  (8bfd865e9d266d35f8f14f9bcda74d85)	  
• 	  “security	  overview”.	  Undated	  document	  apparently	  authored	  by	  Tom	  Howe.	  (61cd9fd78109b0336a5691a3580e3e73)	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In	  this	  section,	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  each	  document	  is	  provided.	  
8.1 Globus	  Online	  Security	  Architecture	  Overview	  This	  Overview	  document	  was	  provided	  after	  several	  review	  iterations	  and	  represented	  a	  significant	  improvement	  by	  the	  Globus	  project	  with	  regards	  to	  their	  documentation.	  This	  document	  contains:	  (1)	  a	  component	  overview	  with	  a	  Globus	  Online	  system	  diagram	  and	  a	  description	  of	  each	  component,	  (2)	  an	  Identity,	  Authentication,	  and	  Authorization	  section	  discussing	  how	  each	  component	  in	  turn	  handles	  these	  issues,	  (3)	  a	  Component	  Interactions	  and	  Protocols	  section	  describing,	  for	  each	  pair	  of	  interacting	  components,	  the	  protocol	  used	  and	  a	  brief	  description	  of	  the	  interaction,	  (4)	  a	  Physical	  Deployment	  section,	  a	  slightly	  mis-­‐named	  section	  discussing	  not	  only	  the	  deployment	  strategy	  but	  deployment	  environments,	  including	  software	  stacks,	  network	  topologies,	  monitoring	  and	  	  logging,	  with	  ample	  diagrams,	  (5)	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  how	  Globus	  Connect	  works,	  (6)	  a	  description	  of	  the	  Software	  Engineering	  process	  and	  (7)	  a	  Glossary	  of	  terms.	  A	  technical	  improvement	  described	  in	  this	  document	  from	  previous	  documentation	  is	  the	  addition	  of	  OAuth	  authentication	  for	  credential	  retrieval,	  mitigating	  the	  need	  for	  Globus	  Online	  to	  request	  MyProxy	  passwords	  from	  its	  users.	  
8.2 Website	  Security	  The	  Website	  Security	  document	  is	  roughly	  4	  pages	  long	  and	  provides	  a	  diagram	  and	  description	  of	  the	  Website	  architecture	  and	  deployment.	  It	  described	  the	  components	  that	  make	  up	  the	  Website	  and	  their	  deployment	  on	  the	  Amazon	  EC2	  service.	  It	  describes	  the	  use	  of	  Amazon	  EC2	  Security	  Groups	  to	  provide	  network-­‐level	  protection	  of	  Website	  components.	  	  Monitoring,	  backups	  and	  administrative	  access	  are	  also	  described.	  The	  web	  cookie	  based	  authentication	  is	  described	  along	  with	  the	  process	  for	  authentication	  with	  OpenId	  and	  interaction	  with	  MyProxy.	  
8.3 File	  Transfer	  Service	  Security	  Overview	  The	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  Security	  Overview	  (first	  version)	  is	  roughly	  4	  pages	  long	  and	  provides	  a	  description	  of	  components	  making	  up	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  architecture	  and	  their	  deployment	  on	  the	  Amazon	  EC2	  service.	  	  A	  discussion	  of	  Amazon	  EC2	  Security	  Groups	  is	  missing	  and	  marked	  as	  a	  “TODO”.	  	  A	  description	  of	  the	  operating	  system	  and	  software	  stack	  used	  is	  provided	  as	  well	  as	  a	  description	  of	  logging.	  A	  list	  of	  user	  information	  assets	  collected	  by	  the	  service	  is	  provided.	  The	  second	  version	  of	  this	  document	  primarily	  added	  a	  half-­‐page	  discussion	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  architecture	  and	  their	  privilege	  levels,	  presumably	  in	  response	  to	  a	  suggestion	  made	  by	  the	  author	  of	  this	  document.	  
8.4 Security	  overview	  The	  rather	  vaguely	  named	  “security	  overview”	  document	  described	  access	  control	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  database	  (presumably	  in	  the	  Website).	  	  It	  is	  a	  roughly	  three-­‐page	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document	  with	  both	  a	  data-­‐oriented	  UML	  diagram	  and	  a	  deployment	  diagram.	  In	  includes	  a	  discussion	  of	  password	  storage	  and	  the	  storage	  of	  secret	  tokens	  used	  to	  authenticate	  API	  requests.	  It	  also	  includes	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  storage	  of	  temporary	  credentials	  and	  the	  fact	  they	  are	  encrypted,	  but	  no	  discussion	  of	  the	  key	  management	  for	  that	  encryption.	  
8.5 Security	  FAQ	  The	  Security	  FAQ	  is	  a	  roughly	  3-­‐page	  document	  containing	  16	  questions.	  The	  text	  indicates	  the	  questions	  came	  from	  Jim	  Marsteller	  in	  his	  role	  as	  TeraGrid	  (now	  XSEDE)	  security	  working	  group	  lead	  and	  from	  a	  second	  individual	  only	  identified	  as	  “Jim.”	  Of	  the	  16	  questions,	  10	  are	  completed.	  The	  answers	  are	  primarily	  a	  restatement	  (and	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  direct	  cut’n’paste)	  of	  information	  found	  in	  other	  documents.	  
8.6 XSEDE	  Security	  Review	  The	  XSEDE	  Security	  Review	  document	  is	  a	  roughly	  11-­‐page	  document.	  Similar	  to	  the	  Security	  FAQ,	  it	  consists	  of	  responses	  to	  a	  request	  from	  the	  XSEDE	  project.	  The	  document	  is	  notable	  in	  that	  it	  contains	  the	  only	  security	  discussion	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  Connect	  service	  found	  by	  this	  document’s	  author.	  
9 Assessment	  of	  Globus	  Online	  Cybersecurity	  
9.1 Stakeholders	  We	  first	  consider	  what	  entities	  would	  be	  impacted	  by	  the	  security	  (or	  flaws	  there	  of)	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  File	  Transfer	  Service.	  The	  primary	  stakeholders	  considered	  are	  (numbers	  are	  nominal	  and	  for	  identification	  only):	  1. Users	  of	  the	  service	  who	  delegate	  credentials	  to	  the	  service	  to	  enable	  its	  use.	  2. Owners	  of	  data	  accessed	  by	  Globus	  Online.	  3. Operators	  of	  data	  services	  (Globus	  Connect,	  GridFTP)	  accessed	  by	  Globus	  Online.	  4. Operators	  of	  other	  services	  not	  accessed	  by	  Globus	  Online,	  but	  that	  could	  be	  accessed	  utilizing	  user	  credentials	  held	  by	  Globus	  Online.	  
9.2 Key	  Risks	  Subjectively,	  the	  three	  main	  cybersecurity	  risks,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  stakeholders,	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  (numbers	  are	  nominal	  and	  for	  identification	  only):	  1. Maliciously	  obtaining	  X.509	  credentials	  (or	  delegations	  there	  of)	  held	  by	  the	  Globus	  Online	  services.	  (Potentially	  affects	  all	  stakeholders.)	  2. Maliciously	  obtaining	  user’s	  MyProxy	  usernames	  and	  passwords	  that	  are	  used	  by	  the	  Globus	  Online	  services	  to	  obtain	  X.509	  credentials	  on	  behalf	  of	  users.	  (Potentially	  affects	  all	  stakeholders.)	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3. Unauthorized	  access	  or	  modification,	  via	  use	  of	  Globus	  Online	  services	  in	  an	  unintended	  manner,	  of	  user	  data	  stored	  on	  other	  services.	  (Potentially	  affects	  stakeholders	  1-­‐3.)	  
9.3 Key	  Protections	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  key	  protections	  in	  place.	  
9.3.1 Amazon	  Security	  Groups/Firewalls	  Amazon	  security	  groups	  act	  as	  network	  firewalls	  to	  both	  limit	  unneeded	  access	  to	  services	  running	  on	  the	  Globus	  Online	  systems	  and	  limit	  access	  to	  services	  to	  trusted	  entities	  (e.g.	  database	  access	  is	  limited	  to	  trusted	  clients).	  
9.3.2 User	  Authentication	  Users	  are	  authenticated	  either	  directly	  (e.g.	  username	  and	  password,	  X.509,	  OpenId)	  or	  subsequently	  via	  a	  web	  session	  cookie.	  
9.3.3 User	  Interfaces	  (Web,	  CLI,	  REST)	  Users	  interfaces	  are	  responsible	  for	  limiting	  a	  user’s	  actions	  based	  on	  their	  authenticated	  identity.	  This	  includes	  establishing	  what	  credentials	  should	  be	  used	  when	  servicing	  their	  requests	  and	  what	  state	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  access.	  
9.3.4 Encryption	  of	  Private	  Key	  Material	  Private	  key	  material	  is	  persistent	  storage	  is	  encrypted.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CA	  used	  for	  the	  Globus	  Connect	  service,	  the	  private	  key	  must	  be	  manually	  decrypted.	  User	  credentials	  in	  the	  database	  are	  encrypted	  with	  a	  cryptographic	  key	  that	  is	  protected	  with	  file	  system	  permissions.	  
9.3.5 Use	  of	  OAuth	  to	  Mitigate	  use	  of	  Passwords	  Addressing	  key	  threat	  #2,	  Globus	  Online	  has	  added	  support	  for	  OAuth5	  so	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  possess	  user’s	  MyProxy	  Passwords,	  reducing	  their	  exposure.	  
9.4 Security	  Concerns	  Given	  the	  risks	  and	  the	  system	  architecture,	  we	  turn	  towards	  an	  assessment	  of	  security	  concerns	  grouped	  by	  architectural	  area.	  Each	  concern	  is	  labeled	  Low,	  Medium	  or	  High	  to	  indicate	  the	  subjective	  weight	  given	  to	  the	  concern.	  
9.4.1 Abuse	  of	  User	  Interfaces	  (Web,	  REST,	  CLI)	  Concern	  #1:	  The	  three	  user	  interfaces	  all	  have	  the	  dual	  responsibility	  of	  authenticating	  the	  request	  and	  ensuring	  it	  is	  legal	  before	  passing	  it	  on	  to	  other	  components	  that	  trust	  that	  they	  have	  done	  so.	  The	  concern	  here	  is	  a	  user	  could	  craft	  a	  malformed	  request	  such	  that	  the	  request	  is	  undertaken	  using	  another	  user’s	  context	  and	  credentials.	  This	  indicates	  this	  code	  implementing	  these	  interfaces	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  more	  details,	  see	  http://www.sciencegatewaysecurity.org/	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would	  be	  a	  prime	  candidate	  for	  more	  extensive	  architectural	  and	  code	  review.	  (Medium)	  Concern	  #2:	  Cross-­‐site	  request	  forgery6	  with	  Web	  and	  REST	  interfaces.	  After	  authenticating	  to	  Globus	  Online	  and	  delegating	  a	  credential,	  a	  user	  could	  visit	  another	  site	  and	  be	  tricked	  (e.g.	  through	  a	  misleading	  form	  or	  a	  form	  submitted	  automatically	  with	  JavaScript)	  into	  submitting	  a	  request	  back	  to	  Globus	  Online	  to	  move	  data	  to	  an	  unauthorized	  receiver,	  or	  overwrite	  data	  from	  an	  authorized	  source.	  (Low)	  Discussions	  with	  the	  Globus	  Online	  developers	  indicate	  this	  concern	  is	  currently	  mitigated	  by	  a	  couple	  factors:	  
• The	  REST	  API	  does	  not	  accept	  request	  as	  would	  be	  generated	  by	  a	  HTML	  form	  element;	  it	  only	  accepts	  AJAX	  requests.	  This	  would	  prevent	  a	  form	  on	  another	  site	  from	  submitting	  a	  request	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  user.	  
• The	  browser	  same-­‐origin	  security	  model	  should	  prevent	  AJAX	  request	  from	  other	  websites	  being	  submitted	  to	  Globus	  Online	  in	  a	  cross-­‐site	  manner.	  Future	  plans	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  team	  include	  including	  the	  session	  cookie	  value	  in	  the	  AJAX	  require	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  stronger	  confirmation	  that	  the	  request	  was	  formulated	  by	  the	  Globus	  Online	  web	  site7.	  Requests	  from	  external	  websites	  will	  be	  authenticated	  with	  OAuth.	  
9.4.2 Databases	  Concern	  #3:	  The	  databases	  (Cassandra	  and	  the	  File	  Transfer	  database)	  both	  hold	  X.509	  credentials	  and	  are	  trusting	  of	  their	  clients	  to	  implement	  appropriate	  access	  control.	  Network	  security	  is	  used	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  the	  databases	  to	  those	  trusted	  clients.	  There	  doesn’t	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  formed	  policy	  on	  what	  client	  components	  should	  have	  what	  permissions,	  or	  an	  audit/logging	  process	  in	  place.	  (High)	  Concern	  #4:	  Password	  storage	  is	  not	  best	  practices.	  Passwords	  are	  currently	  stored	  as	  unsalted	  SHA-­‐512	  hashed	  strings.	  Best	  practice	  would	  be	  to	  use	  a	  different	  salt	  for	  each	  password	  and	  a	  hash	  algorithm	  better	  suited	  for	  password	  storage	  (e.g.	  bcrypt8).	  (Medium)	  
9.4.3 Backups	  Concern	  #5:	  Backups	  of	  the	  databases	  are	  made	  frequently	  to	  help	  with	  availability.	  These	  backups	  apparently	  hold	  copies	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  database	  contents	  (including	  X.509	  credentials).	  There	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  well-­‐defined	  policy	  on	  backup	  security.	  (Medium)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-­‐site_request_forgery	  7	  https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/XSRF#Prevention	  8	  http://codahale.com/how-­‐to-­‐safely-­‐store-­‐a-­‐password/	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9.4.4 Distributed	  Administration	  Concern	  #6:	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  Globus	  Online	  and	  the	  systems	  that	  host	  the	  service	  –	  the	  Globus	  Project	  at	  U.	  Chicago	  and	  Argonne,	  the	  Argonne	  MCS	  Systems	  Team,	  and	  Amazon.	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  some	  increased	  risk	  just	  due	  to	  the	  number	  of	  “cooks	  in	  the	  kitchen.”	  For	  example,	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  coordination	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  incident?	  There	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  incident	  response	  plan	  in	  place.	  (Low)	  Concern	  #7:	  Using	  Amazon	  to	  host	  the	  service	  introduces	  the	  possibility	  of	  misbehavior	  on	  their	  part,	  either	  organizationally	  or	  by	  a	  misbehaving	  employee.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  either	  of	  these	  is	  anything	  but	  a	  remote	  concern,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  something	  the	  Globus	  Project	  finds	  difficult	  to	  refute	  in	  socializing	  the	  security	  of	  their	  service.	  (Low)	  
9.4.5 Assessment	  of	  Globus	  Connect	  Concern	  #8:	  The	  cybersecurity	  architecture	  and	  trust	  model	  of	  the	  Globus	  Connect	  system	  is	  not	  currently	  well	  documented.	  While	  the	  author	  finds	  no	  obvious	  flaws	  based	  on	  descriptions	  of	  the	  service,	  it	  has	  a	  complicated	  architecture,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Multi-­‐User	  mode	  of	  operation.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  this	  service	  only	  places	  those	  who	  chose	  to	  install	  it	  at	  risk.	  Security	  documentation	  for	  Globus	  Connect	  should	  be	  drafted	  and	  a	  subsequent	  evaluation	  should	  be	  undertaken,	  particularly	  of	  its	  multi-­‐user	  mode.	  (Medium)	  Concern	  #9:	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi-­‐user	  should	  have	  appropriate,	  documented	  safeguards	  to	  ensure	  that	  only	  the	  local	  CA	  is	  trusted	  for	  incoming	  clients	  and	  that	  what	  local	  user	  accounts	  can	  be	  accessed.	  Ideally,	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  users	  would	  be	  accessible	  regardless	  of	  what	  username	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  distinguished	  name	  and	  privileged	  accounts	  (e.g.	  root)	  would	  be	  off-­‐limits.	  This	  would	  mitigate	  the	  use	  of	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi-­‐user	  as	  a	  privilege	  escalation	  attack.	  (Medium)	  
9.4.6 Limiting	  Authentication	  Guess9	  Concern	  #10:	  The	  Globus	  Web	  UI	  does	  not	  currently	  implement	  protections	  against	  brute	  force	  password	  guessing.	  (Low)	  
10 Recommendations	  
10.1 Documentation	  of	  Policies	  and	  Principles	  The	  Globus	  Online	  team	  should	  be	  commended	  for	  the	  security	  documentation	  they	  have	  produced,	  in	  particular	  the	  overview	  document	  produced	  after	  a	  few	  iterations	  of	  this	  review.	  This	  overview	  document	  addresses	  many	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  prior	  documentation	  in	  that	  it	  provided	  a	  consistent	  format	  across	  multiple	  components,	  it	  provided	  explicit	  descriptions	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Full	  credit	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  this	  concern	  belongs	  with	  the	  PRACE	  project	  team.	  It	  is	  included	  here	  for	  completeness.	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components,	  provided	  numerous	  diagrams	  and	  provided	  a	  description	  of	  the	  previously	  poorly	  document	  Globus	  Connect	  mechanism,	  all	  of	  which	  combined	  to	  better	  communicate	  the	  architecture.	  One	  shortcoming	  however	  is	  that	  the	  current	  documentation	  	  describes	  practice	  more	  than	  principles	  and	  policy.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  captures	  the	  “What”	  but	  not	  the	  “Why”.	  It	  would	  be	  good	  to	  start	  with	  some	  high-­‐level	  principles	  (e.g.	  delegated	  X.509	  credentials	  should	  only	  be	  utilized	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  delegated	  them;	  only	  trusted	  entities	  should	  have	  communication	  with	  the	  database)	  and	  then	  distill	  those	  to	  polices	  (X.509	  credentials	  can	  only	  be	  used	  with	  jobs	  whose	  owner	  matches	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  credentials;	  only	  trusted	  entities	  should	  be	  in	  the	  same	  security	  group	  as	  the	  database)	  and	  then	  finally	  to	  practices	  (Processing	  Elements	  will	  check	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  job	  and	  credential	  and	  make	  sure	  they	  match;	  the	  graphapp	  security	  group	  will	  only	  include	  images	  X,	  Y	  and	  Z).	  
10.2 Address	  Cross	  Site	  Request	  Forgery	  Issues	  in	  User	  Interface	  The	  project	  should	  follow	  through	  on	  their	  plans	  to	  add	  a	  session	  token	  (and	  its	  corresponding	  validation)	  to	  their	  REST	  API	  calls	  and	  utilize	  OAuth	  to	  ensure	  only	  trusted	  third	  party	  can	  allow	  users	  to	  submit	  requests.	  The	  project	  will	  need	  to	  consider	  what	  expectations	  they	  expect	  third	  parties	  to	  live	  up	  to	  in	  terms	  of	  ensuring	  requests	  are	  accurate	  representations	  of	  user	  desire.	  
10.3 Document	  a	  Database-­‐centric	  Privileges	  Policy	  Securing	  the	  database	  is	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  security	  architecture.	  However	  the	  database	  is	  a	  trusting	  entity	  and	  any	  entity	  that	  can	  communicate	  with	  it	  is	  trusted	  to	  enforce	  at	  least	  some	  portion	  of	  the	  Globus	  Online	  security	  policy.	  The	  task	  of	  enumerating	  what	  privileges	  each	  entity	  should	  have	  to	  the	  database	  should	  be	  undertaken.	  To	  the	  extent	  possible,	  controls	  should	  be	  put	  into	  place	  to	  actually	  limit	  trust	  in	  those	  entities	  and	  enforce	  those	  limits	  as	  close	  to	  the	  database	  as	  possible.	  But	  even	  knowing	  the	  limits	  will	  help	  with	  intrusion	  detection	  by	  being	  able	  to	  say	  when	  an	  entity	  has	  violated	  its	  trust	  (e.g.	  an	  entity	  that	  isn’t	  supposed	  to	  write	  does	  so).	  
10.4 Firewall/Security	  Group	  Testing	  Because	  the	  database	  is	  a	  trusting	  entity,	  Amazon	  Security	  Groups	  are	  used	  to	  implement	  a	  network	  firewall	  limiting	  access	  to	  it.	  Monitoring	  should	  be	  expanded	  to	  help	  ensure	  those	  firewalls	  are	  acting	  appropriate.	  In	  other	  words,	  regular	  testing	  should	  be	  implemented	  to	  make	  help	  sure	  there	  isn’t	  accidental	  or	  malicious	  configuration	  changes	  that	  expose	  the	  database	  to	  entities	  who	  should	  not	  have	  access.	  
10.5 Logging	  Strategy	  A	  logging	  strategy	  should	  be	  created	  and	  implemented.	  The	  strategy	  should	  set	  forward	  some	  well-­‐defined	  goals,	  e.g.:	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• Be	  able	  to	  trace	  every	  action	  of	  the	  File	  Transfer	  Service	  (e.g.	  data	  movement)	  back	  to	  a	  user	  input.	  
• Be	  able	  to	  trace	  every	  delegation	  of	  an	  X.509	  credential	  to	  the	  service	  and	  every	  subsequent	  use	  of	  that	  credential.	  
• Be	  able	  to	  trace	  every	  access	  of	  the	  database	  and	  show	  it	  was	  within	  the	  privileges	  of	  the	  client.	  Ideally	  logging	  would	  be	  implemented	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  so	  that	  is	  as	  “write	  only”	  as	  possible,	  i.e.	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  for	  an	  entity	  to	  alter	  or	  delete	  lots	  no	  matter	  how	  privileged	  they	  were.	  This	  would	  probably	  entail	  the	  logging	  host	  being	  located	  in	  separate	  infrastructure.	  The	  EGEE	  Middleware	  Security	  Audit	  Logging	  Guidelines10	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  defining	  general	  auditing	  practices.	  
10.6 Backup	  Strategy	  There	  should	  be	  a	  backup	  strategy	  that	  includes	  whether	  or	  not	  backups	  contain	  sensitive	  data	  (e.g.	  X.509	  credentials)	  or	  such	  data	  is	  filtered	  out	  when	  backups	  are	  created.	  Based	  on	  that	  decision,	  the	  backups	  should	  be	  appropriately	  secured.	  E.g.	  Access	  to	  backups	  should	  be	  logged.	  
10.7 Auditing	  X.509	  Credentials	  Each	  credential	  delegated	  to	  Globus	  Online	  should	  be	  uniquely	  identifiable	  by	  both	  the	  public	  key	  and	  the	  certificate	  serial	  number.	  Logging	  of	  all	  received	  credentials	  could	  help	  in	  any	  investigation	  since	  it	  could	  serve	  to	  help	  confirm	  or	  refute	  a	  credential	  having	  passed	  through	  Globus	  Online.	  
10.8 Implement	  State	  of	  the	  Art	  Password	  Storage	  Referencing	  Concern	  #4,	  storage	  of	  passwords	  in	  the	  database	  should	  use	  best	  practices.	  
10.9 Implement	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi-­‐User	  Safeguards	  Referencing	  Concern	  #9,	  Globus	  Connect	  Multi-­‐User	  should	  have	  well-­‐documented	  policies	  and	  safeguards	  to	  ensure	  only	  the	  appropriate	  local	  CA	  is	  utilized	  and	  privileged	  local	  accounts	  are	  not	  accessible.	  
10.10 Implement	  Brute	  Password	  Guessing	  Mitigations	  Referencing	  Concern	  #10,	  the	  Globus	  Web	  UI	  should	  take	  steps	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	  failed	  authentications	  to	  prevent	  password	  guessing.	  Standard	  practices	  include	  locking	  an	  account	  after	  some	  number	  (e.g.	  10)	  failed	  guesses,	  or	  implementing	  a	  static	  or	  exponential	  delay	  between	  attempts	  to	  slow	  guessing	  to	  rates	  which	  make	  it	  unfeasible.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  https://edms.cern.ch/document/793208	  
